What Solutions Can Prevent the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation?

Communist Review (online) – On 25 May 2009, the DPRK officially announced that it had successfully conducted an underground nuclear test, stating that the test was “part of measures to bolster its nuclear deterrent for self-defence". This was the DPRK's second nuclear test, following the one in October 2006.

The developments that followed this nuclear test are deeply worrying. Just one day later, on 26 May 2009, the Republic of Korea decided to join the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) proposed by the United States. As a PSI participant, the Republic of Korea will work with other participating states to interdict and search vessels of countries suspected of transporting materials related to weapons of mass destruction. In response, the DPRK regarded this action by the Republic of Korea as a "declaration of war"; it also declared that Pyongyang was withdrawing from the Armistice Agreement it had signed with Seoul in 1953 and was ready to respond forcefully with military power to any attempt by the Republic of Korea to seize or search DPRK vessels.

The escalating tension on the Korean Peninsula in the last days of May has become the focus of world public attention. Countries have voiced their opposition to the test and expressed their support for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, while calling on the DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks.

The ambassadors of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), together with the Republic of Korea and Japan, met to discuss a draft UNSC resolution on the DPRK proposed by Japan and the United States, but have not yet reached a final agreement. However, what concerns public opinion most is what form sanctions against the DPRK should take so as both to cool this “boiling pot” and to prevent countries that do not yet possess nuclear weapons from seeking to acquire them, and countries that already possess them from using them as bargaining leverage and a deterrent to achieve political objectives in international relations.

This concern is not without foundation, because historically the process of nuclear proliferation has always been shaped by two opposing groups of factors: restraining factors and stimulating factors.

The restraining group includes the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in force since 1970, whose most important provisions allow States Parties to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes, while non-nuclear-weapon States undertake not to research, develop or acquire such weapons on condition that the States possessing nuclear weapons eliminate them completely. After almost 40 years, the nuclear non-proliferation regime is facing serious difficulties. Iran has come close to being able to build a nuclear bomb, while the DPRK has withdrawn from the NPT and has twice tested nuclear weapons. The United States has abandoned its commitments on banning nuclear tests, withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and continued to develop new nuclear weapons.

In addition to the NPT, there are numerous international treaties banning the testing and use of nuclear weapons underwater, underground, in the atmosphere and in outer space, with a view to establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. The factors in the restraining group have had a positive effect, so that to date the number of states possessing nuclear weapons remains small. However, it is quite clear that the existing nuclear non-proliferation mechanism is still weak and not persuasive enough for countries on the issue of developing nuclear technology. For example, at the 2005 NPT conference, the United States and a number of its allies proposed introducing a new provision into the NPT completely banning the transfer of nuclear enrichment technology. This was an unfair "initiative" towards states with a genuine need to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The stimulating group comprises many factors, the most notable of which is the world's shift, from the early 1990s, to a new generation of warfare – high-tech warfare. Many countries have acquired high-precision guided weapons controlled from land, sea, air and space, with very long strike ranges, capable of attacking and destroying key targets in any country without violating its territory, and even with destructive power comparable to that of tactical nuclear weapons. These weapons have given rise to an entirely new method of warfare, known as non-contact, long-range strike, which the United States tested in the Gulf War (1991), the Kosovo War (1999), the war in Afghanistan (2001) and the Iraq War (2003). Some states facing the threat of a war of aggression have decided to research and build nuclear weapons as a tool to deter war. Researchers around the world have speculated that if Yugoslavia, Afghanistan or Iraq had possessed nuclear weapons, they would not have been drawn into a war of aggression. This is one of the reasons why many countries are determined to possess nuclear weapons or to reach the threshold of nuclear weapons capability.

Regrettably, ever since the United States dropped atomic bombs on Japan in 1945, the stimulating factors have continued to outweigh the restraining factors. Thus, whereas before the 1990s nuclear proliferation was conducted in secret, after the end of the "Cold War" nuclear proliferation appears to have become more open, with states possessing nuclear weapons even intending to publicise their achievements early in order to deter acts of war by other countries.

In today's globalised world, the interdependence between states is becoming ever closer in economic, political and national security terms. Therefore, the DPRK nuclear issue in particular, and the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula in general, can only be resolved through the Six-Party Talks mechanism; there is no other way, because the issue involves many countries outside the Korean Peninsula.

The fundamental and long-term solution to preventing the risk of nuclear war is for the United Nations to develop a global nuclear strategy. On that basis, each state would develop its own nuclear strategy, creating coordinated joint action to eliminate nuclear weapons completely and to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes./.